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D R A F T
IAD - 65/66
20 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on the Establishment of a Clandestine
Reconnaissance and Targeting Capability in
Southeast Asia []

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1. This memorandum contains my thoughts on [] proposal
(TS 194763) regarding a Target Center in Southeast Asia.

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25X1 2. The application of [] techniques against the Ho Chi
Minh Trail and other areas of Laos is a logical extension of the
conventional reconnaissance programs presently in effect. There is no
25X1 question that a [] approach would broaden the intelligence data
base of those concerned with the Laos problem; however, unless steps
were taken to assure prompt action the program [] advocates
appears quite unresponsive to the immediate needs of the Agency.

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
3. Indicative of the problem the Agency currently faces in their
25X1A [] operations - targeted against Laos - are the []
25X1A [] who have been working an average of 74 hours per week. Such a
25X1A load has led to [] of them having to be hospitalized because of the long
hours and pressure. Such sustained performance speaks highly of the
individuals but causes me considerable concern regarding their physical
well-being. I would favor any implementation of a program which would
serve immediately to augment the existing photo interpretation effort

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25X1A [] Much could be done to improve the [] setup within 60-90 days and it is in this area where we could be expected to make a major contribution.

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4. Regarding the allocation of photo interpreters and photo lab processing personnel to a Target Center operation, I would need to know a great deal more before making a specific commitment. Counting

25X1A the PIs presently [] the Imagery Analysis Division could probably

25X1A increase the total to [] photo interpreters at a very minimum cost to Agency requesters. The staffing of a photo lab processing facility is quite another story. Offhand I would say we could probably provide the training necessary to operate a photo lab but most of the people would have to be drawn from the Agency as a whole - specially from those components with a photo lab capability of their own.

25X1A 5. [] proposal mentioned the possible use of []
25X1A [] manpower sources were inadequate.

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25X1A I firmly believe that all of the photo interpreters - within a reasonable number such [] - should be provided by the Imagery Analysis Division; their exclusion in the proposed operation would deny the Agency an opportunity to enhance its own PI assets through field work and experience with multisensor techniques.

6. In discussions with senior IAD intelligence officers, the distinct impression is given that they regard [] proposal more as an R&D

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and field test program than as a realistic approach to the immediate needs of the Agency in the Laos problem. I concur in their overall view on the subject, particularly in terms of pursuing a course where prompt action is the order of the day. [] plan in calling for new aircraft and the equipping of these aircraft with [] devices suggests a long, drawn out approach with its inefficacy only too apparent.

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7. The Laos problem calls for an immediate augmentation of the existing PI assets [] with the addition of a photo lab facility capable of handling all [] inputs as they are made operationally reliable and productive.

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ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director

National Photographic Interpretation Center

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